Trackman numbers have a way of artificially flattening what we all know to be the most difficult and complex practice of the sport: projecting what prospects will eventually be able to do at the highest level.
Young for the level? Long-levered and uncoordinated at an early age? Learning a difficult defensive position? Dealing with a family tragedy? It's amazing how much all that context melts away when an Excel chart tells you that a player's in-zone swing-and-miss rate is 10 percentage points higher than the MiLB average. It will be largely positive and edifying when minor league Trackman numbers become widely public, but it will also launch some of the most blinkered Twitter threads mankind has ever seen.
But because actually predicting things about the White Sox appears to anger higher powers with a ghoulish sense of humor, let's use the data as a guide for what needs to happen for a few key prospects to have the sort of 2025 seasons upon which genuine hope can be built.
Noah Schultz: Let the four-seamer take over
The most fun way to incorporate data is to let it confirm what you already think/what is already happening. Schultz's sinker tunnels with his superlative slider and fits naturally with his arm path, as evidenced by his well above-average command with it. But as much as he can pour it in the zone, opponents were flirting with a 90 percent in-zone contact rate against it, which portended poorly against major leaguers who will likely be able to both touch it a bit more, and actually do something with it when they do.
Aware of this situation, the White Sox already had Schultz throwing more elevated four-seamers by the end of the season, and the results implore them to keep going. Schultz maintained his above-average strike-throwing when throwing four-seamers, touched 98 mph with it, and the whiffs it generates in the strike zone are comparable to his dominant slider (it obviously doesn't generate the same amount of chase). The four-seamer is more vulnerable to extra-base damage when opponents do make contact, and there's no point in junking the sinker when he can throw both for strikes so consistently, but it's another option against opponents who will expecting the signature slider in two-strike situations.
Jairo Iriarte: Rediscover the four-seamer
Cheating again here, as pitching coach Ethan Katz discussed at the end of the year that Iriarte's fastball had flattened out to the degree that it was frequently getting coded as a sinker on the broadcast during his major league cameo. While fully reclaiming the 16 inches of inverted vertical break had to become an offseason project, the differences were clear enough when Iriarte slipped into full-on sinker mode. The increased horizontal movement on the sinker made it harder for Iriarte to keep it in the strike zone or command the pitch in general, leading to meaningfully fewer strikes and more damage.
A more consistent heater could pay dividends for Iriarte's changeup, which gets big chase numbers but is too erratic to get incorporated enough to have major impact.
Grant Taylor: Any command gains could make him monstrous
My favorite pitching bromide is when someone suggests a prospect "just needs to learn to command." You know, just improve the most important and difficult aspect of pitching, and then it's easy street. But it really does underscore how much Taylor's 25-1 strikeout-to-walk ratio in Low-A was about overpowering hitters -- and why his AFL might have been so choppy -- when seeing that his slider (which has touched 91 mph) is his only pitch that earned an above-average chase rate in 2024.
It's not because his stuff is lacking, but Taylor's slider is ahead of the rest of the crop for being something he can land in the shadow of the zone at a good clip. If he can just get all his pitches on the level of a well-located low-90s slider, then yeah, easy street. Jokes aside, an critical lack of in-game reps would seem to both be the cause of these issues, and point to the obvious remedy that 2025 should offer.
Edgar Quero: Hit like you're always ahead in the count
A catcher who consistently gets on base against older competition seems like a pretty good bet, and Quero's bonafide top-100 prospect status affirms that. But it helps that he plays a spot where his hitting is a bonus, because his offensive skill set takes a funny shape when it comes to projecting it forward. Quero whacked 16 homers in under 100 games last season, despite Regions Field being his home base for most of it, but neither his size nor exit velocities suggest above-average power in the majors.
Walks and sub-20 percent strikeout rates have been an even more consistent hallmark of Quero's professional resume, and a continuation of those would make it pretty hard for him to hurt a ballclub offensively even if he swapped out his maple bat for a foam pool noodle. But while Quero's overall chase rates suggest a great batting eye, they doubled upon him reaching two-strikes last year -- it goes up for everyone, but that's a huge jump -- which aligned with his walk rate sliding below 10 percent for the year.
Is Quero just patient early in the count, at a level where wild minor league arms can often let you know early that a walk is coming if you want it? And how will that translate to the majors when that's a far less frequent phenomenon? Is Quero's two-strike stroke simply great for contact, as evidenced by even Triple-A pitching being unable to spike his strikeout rate? And thus his approach will morph against nastier stuff? Or is he, you know, a 21-year-old playing older competition while helming the most difficult defensive position in the sport, and the final view of him is simply unclear?
George Wolkow: In-zone swing-and-miss
Wolkow spent most of the second half obsessing over his chases; a healthier in-season choice for a relentless perfectionist. The games and the opposing pitchers are providing daily information about what it looks like when that outer-half slider is actually going to be strike-to-ball, and Wolkow was right to put it to use. Given how much of a three-true outcome hitter he projects to be, it's unsurprising that Wolkow won't take a two-strike chase rate that roughly average across MiLB as acceptable, even in a year that he played completely at 18 years of age. But an in-zone whiff rate that was twice the major league average is the real mountain to climb for Wolkow to reach his potential.
It's fun to watch the differing reactions to this, where some outlets describe such in-zone swing-and-miss as disastrous, and some league scouts remain completely unmoved by it, as it tracks precisely with the boom-or-bust projection they put on the enormous outfielder on draft night. As much as Wolkow's physique already has a passing resemblance to Aaron Judge, he's clearly still developing physically and mentally. His present exit velocities don't blow Colson Montgomery off the page yet, even if his frame clearly indicates he could/should one day. He was always going to swing-and-miss a ton out of the gate, and the swing should clearly become more compact and refined over time as is the case for every moderately successful professional hitter, but how much? Who knows; there are only tens of millions of dollars at stake.
Alexander Albertus: Hit the ball just a bit harder
Jeral Pérez seems like the safest person to place hope in for redeeming the Erick Fedde trade, since he was both healthy and performed throughout the 2024 season. But Trackman validates a perception of Pérez as someone who does everything well while maintaining grasp of a middle infield spot, rather than touting a carrying physical tool. Miguel Vargas is the only member of the trio who has been a top-100 prospect before, but the fan base has watched too much of him at his worst -- and just too much White Sox baseball in general -- to pin their hopes on his reclamation efforts just yet. That there are some White Sox higher-ups who believe Albertus could be the best of the trio would carry more weight had he not missed the second half with a fracture in his left tibia that eventually required surgery.
Personally, there's a separate White Sox triptych featuring Albertus, and one where the comparisons fascinate me more. Recently acquired Chase Meidroth lends the sense that the Sox traded for an older and thus more advanced model of their fifth round pick, Sam Antonacci. Neither infielder will probably do much beyond moonlighting at shortstop, so both will seek to discover if an offensive profile built around rarely chasing and rarely whiffing can overcome a lack of power at a non-premium position. At his present state, Albertus seems cut from a similar cloth. His 7 percent swinging-strike rate was slightly higher than what Nick Madrigal managed for the Cubs last year, and his .342/.479/.459 showing in complex league ball last year was backed up by good swing decisions in all situations.
That Albertus only slugged .329 in 19 games at Low-A is more reflective of a below-average maximum exit velocity and hard-hit rates that have fueled 30 and 40 grades placed on his power. Since Albertus is projected more specifically to third base, that's a tougher route to making a living, even if the White Sox have, and will continue to, employ a remarkable number of underpowered third baseman. But since he's also younger (20), taller (6'1") and a tad more projectable than his contact-craving counterparts, following Albertus in 2025 is a bit more geared around waiting for maturation than wondering if he can keep getting away with this.
