I had just begun reading Joe Posnanski’s 9,000-word entry on the last decade of Kansas City Royals baseball when one quote brought my eyes and mind to a halt for a few seconds:

“What (Earl) Weaver NEVER used were the guy who didn’t do anything specific, but looked good in the uniform, the .260 hitters with 10 to 15 homers, a little speed and so-so defense.”
– Bill James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers.

Later on, Posnanski explains:

I put Bill James’ thought about Earl Weaver up there because Weaver always had a point to everything he did. That was his strength. That’s what made his teams great. Every move had a specific purpose. This guy played because he was sensational defensively, and this guy played because he got on base at a very high rate, and this guy played because he destroyed right handed pitching, and this guy played because he never walked anybody, and this guy played because he was magical on the double play, and this guy played because he stole bases at a very high percentage, and this guy played because he destroyed left-handed pitching. And so on. There was always purpose to the moves. Earl didn’t want guys who could “play baseball.” He wanted guys who could “do something.”

You might beat me to the punch, but why did this quote give me pause?

Because Mark Teahen is the exact player James is deriding.

Average out his last two seasons, and here’s what you get — .263 batting average, 14 homers, six stolen bases, and while there are sample-size issues due to the way he’s been deployed, his defensive ratings haven’t been encouraging at any position he’s played.  On top of that, his key peripherals are going in the wrong direction.

Now, you can’t apply that 12-year-old notion by James equally to every situation.  The Sox are one of those teams that, in previous years, may have been helped by an extra 90 OPS+, which sounds about what James is describing.  Depending on the year, that would’ve been a godsend in center, left, third base, second base or shortstop.  Mediocre-to-average players would have gone further in this organization than most, because there have been an awful lot of holes.

In 2010, however, now this line of thinking becomes dangerous.  Jim Thome and Jermaine Dye are (probably) gone; Paul Konerko’s into his decline phase. Carlos Quentin, the most crucial part of the 2010 team, is a big question mark.  Alex Rios is streaky at best.  Alexei Ramirez might not be a dynamic player.  Gordon Beckham has to overcome the sophomore jinx.

Fearmongering isn’t my goal here, but it does illustrate that the Sox don’t have a guy in the lineup where you can say, “Barring injury, this guy will give you 600 PAs of 120 OPS+ offense, at least.”

This is the environment in which acquiring Generic Q. Ballplayer (“Gene” for short) can’t really help.  In fact, there’s a bigger chance his presence could make it harder on everybody.  Simply put:

More guys with vague skill sets –> Fewer obvious decisions –> More ways a manager can screw it up

Ozzie Guillen may say he welcomes the challenge of a “flexible” lineup, but does anybody seriously think he would reject surefire pieces in order to mix-and-match?  Nobody had fun trying to figure out a back end of the rotation while waiting for Jake Peavy to get healthy last year, and that’s basically what Guillen would have to do with a lineup full of Teahens, Kotsays and Joneses.

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